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Introduction 
 
The conversation about the digital divide has developed over the last decade from a focus 
on connectivity and access to information and communication technologies, to a 
conversation that encompasses the ability to use them and to the utility that usage 
provides (Wei et al., 2011). However, the understanding of the divide has not developed 
in policy circles to describe disparity in access to information, in the ability to 
communicate, or in the capacity to make information and communication serve full 
participation in the information society.  
In fact, much of the literature focusing on the “digital divide,” developed either 
from viewing the “divide” as an access issue or from attributing it to “online skills” (e.g., 
Hargittai 2002). Policies that have emanated from this limited view focused on either 
providing physical access to ICTs, through subsidies or through the enactment of 
community computer centers, or on providing the less connected with “online skills,” 
mostly uniform skills tied to basic uses of computer and Internet applications: mail and 
Microsoft’s “Office” applications.  
In this chapter we describe how policies aimed at tackling the digital divide 
emerged originally on the margins of the universal service debate focusing on the 
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“divide” instead of on the exclusion that is its outcome; how digital exclusion emerges 
and is enhanced; and why this policy discourse, which is rooted in utilitarianism should 
be replaced by a redistributive justice philosophy.. 
Universal access as a focus of communication policy  
Universal access to telecommunications is a policy associated with network services, 
such as the telephone, and the services that emanated from it (Internet access), or 
resemble it (mobile telephony). It is a term developed in the United States, however, 
while many would prefer to believe that universal service has always been a goal of 
telecommunications policy in the United States it was in fact a ploy to maintain AT&T’s 
monopoly at the beginning of the 20th century (Mueller, 1997), and instead of meaning 
universal access for consumers, it meant a universal network controlled by AT&T. 
Universal service became law only in the 1996 act, incorporating the mechanisms created 
originally for the purpose of subsidizing the local access of consumers through higher 
prices on long distance calls.  The law only describes the level of service as ‘evolving,’ 
leaving it to regulators to determine the specifics, except for the unique provision of 
subsidizing Internet access to schools, libraries and health care providers (known as the 
‘E-rate’) (Schejter, 2009).  In 2011, the Federal Communications Commission 
modernizeג universal access and included in it also broadband communications and to 3G 
and 4G mobile networks.1  
In Europe, however, universal service was not historically a central element of 
information and communication policy, which were designed to guarantee continuity of 
service and not universality of supply (Garnham, 2001). Still, with the liberalization of 
                                                 
1 http://www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/universal-service  
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market policies in the late 1980s and early 1990s universal service was mentioned as a 
pan-European goal (Schejter, 2009). It became part of the European Directives in 1997, 
when it was defined as a minimum “set of services of specified quality which is available 
to all users independent of their geographical location and, in the light of specific national 
conditions, at an affordable price.”2 In 2002, a further Directive called for periodical 
reviews of the scope of universal service “in the light of social, economic and 
technological developments.”3 The Directive further stipulated that the European 
Commission must consider “public intervention [when] specific services are not provided 
to the public under normal commercial circumstances.”4 
One can identify therefore two differing universal access philosophies developing 
in the United States and the European Union. The U.S. guiding principle is identification 
through regulatory means of the technological minimum all citizens should be guaranteed 
and proactive government subsidy to ensure it. The European system, on the other hand, 
identifies the desired technological minimum by analyzing consumer behavior and 
adoption of services, and aims to resolve it through corrective market mechanisms. Still, 
in both cases, the driver of the policy is technology, the desired norm is access to the 
technology, and the means to reach it is through commercial providers driving the 
process.  
Parallel policy to universal access relating to content services was set to ensure 
that unidirectional “broadcast” signals reach the whole citizenry. In the United States 
obligations to provide a television signal that can be received by the whole population 
                                                 
2 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:31997L0033  
3 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32002L0022  
4 Ibid (at Annex V) 
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were set since the 1930s. In Europe, due to the national nature of traditional broadcasting 
services, national coverage requirements were part of the obligation of national 
broadcasters. Indeed, in both systems, additional policies were developed to ensure 
access to the media of diverse voices, each system within the confines of the limited 
number of service providers. Those requirements really could – if used with integrity – 
provide some access to a variety of ideas, but not to a significant number of people and 
not to opinions and beliefs enjoying little support.  
The correlation between Universal Access and digital divide policies 
The precursor to the discussion of the digital divide, as a policy issue in the United States, 
is often seen as the National Telecommunication and Information Administration’s 
(NTIA) report on “Falling Through the Net,” which describes itself as focusing on “the 
digital divide, the concept that the society should not be separated into information haves 
and information have-nots” (NTIA, 2000, p. xiii). By the year 2000, it evolved to “make 
certain that everyone is included in the digital economy” (Ibid). It was not until 2011, as 
noted above, that broadband access became the goal of universal service policy, yet even 
then, the policy was designed with ensuring access to the technology in mind. Prior to 
that, only a small portion of the funds generated for “universal access” was devoted to 
providing Internet access, and even that was limited to schools and libraries. The majority 
of the funding went to building infrastructure in rural and low-income areas, however not 
infrastructure that was to carry broadband services. 
The beginnings of the European policy effort, aimed at bridging the “digital 
divide”, were even more modest (van Dijk, 2009). They can probably be traced to the 
2000 European Council meeting held in Lisbon, of which the goal was to agree on a new 
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strategic goal for the European Union in order “to strengthen employment, economic 
reform and social cohesion as part of a knowledge-based economy.”5 The eventual effort 
that ensued led to the development of the eEurope “action plans.” However, these were 
mostly non-binding documents, which each member state could adopt at will. The 
binding policies were those emanating from the universal service directives described 
above. At the same time, in countries such as Estonia (Woodward, 2003), Finland 
(Riesinger, 2009), France (London Times, 2009), Greece (Constitution of Greece, 2009), 
and Spain (Reuters, 2009), access to broadband had started making its way into 
constitutional documents.  
Proactive policies aimed at tackling the “digital divide” focus on connectivity and 
access. In fact, they are descendants of universal service policies, even if they were not 
described as such. They were formed in a policy world still bifurcated into 
“telecommunications” and “broadcasting,” and identified with the former. However, it is 
technologically not in question that contemporary media defy these traditional 
boundaries. In order to understand why universal dissemination of contemporary media 
should be policy, one needs to both understand how contemporary media are different 
from their predecessors and what social goals they can help achieve. 
What contemporary media’s characteristics means to communications 
Communication is the transfer of information (Wiley, 2013) and some even add that it is 
the transfer of meaning (Fabun, 1968). The qualities of both the process (communication) 
and the matter that it carries (information) are what differentiate among media of 
                                                 
5 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lis1_en.htm  
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communications. Recently the term “new media” is used in order to differentiate between 
“old” and contemporary media.  
In previous work, we identified four characteristics whose combination 
differentiates contemporary media from their predecessors: abundance (of content and 
channels), mobility, interactivity and multi-mediality. (Schejter & Tirosh, 2014; 2015) 
These characteristics make these media different from the user perspective. They are not 
technological per se rather they highlight what these media provide users which their 
predecessors did not. Indeed, contemporary media changed what we define as “the 
sociability of media” - a combination of the quality of both the information that is 
communicated and of the communication that is mediated. Thus, contemporary media 
contribute to a more effective communication process. 
Yet, while understanding what contemporary media actually allow their users, we 
still need to evaluate what those who don’t have access to contemporary media are 
deprived from.  
Universal service of the new media era is tackling digital exclusion 
While economic and technological justifications have traditionally played a role in 
regulatory design, Napoli (1999) identified three fundamental differences between 
communications regulation and the regulation of other industries: the unique potential for 
social and political impact; the ambiguity of classification of decisions along economic or 
social regulatory lines; and the potential overlap and interaction between economic and 
social concerns within individual decisions.  
Napoli’s observation points to the challenge of traditional policymaking when 
facing contemporary media: because communication technologies serve a social goal, 
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and because their potential for positive social impact is high, focusing on their 
technological characteristics (as the United States’ law delineates), or on economic 
measures of adoption (as the European principles dictate) is just not enough in order to 
design successful policy. The meaning of contemporary media and their role in and 
contribution to society need to be rethought.  
One successful attempt in conceptualizing the social impact of the differences in 
access to and utilization of digital communication technologies, was developed by van 
Dijk (2005) whose sequential model for analyzing the divide states that:  
“1. Categorical inequalities in society produce an unequal distribution of 
resources; 2. An unequal distribution of resources causes unequal access to 
digital technologies; 3. Unequal access to digital technologies also depends 
on the characteristics of these technologies; 4. Unequal access to digital 
technologies brings about unequal participation in society; 5. Unequal 
participation in society reinforces categorical inequalities and unequal 
distributions of resources.” (p. 15) 
 
Indeed, as van Dijk’s model demonstrates (see figure 1), the inequality’s impact is the 
exclusion of individuals from participation, and not merely a measure of “connectivity” 
(as counted in the old “telecommunications” paradigm), or “reception” (as measures in 
the old “broadcasting” paradigm). As such, a transition in terminology is needed. The 
problem is not a divide between haves and have-nots of things “digital,” but rather the 
exclusion from participating in the social processes that the digital experience creates the 
opportunity for. It is therefore a conversation about overcoming “digital exclusion.”  
The goal of bridging digital exclusion is ensuring participation. It makes policy 
challenges very different from those facing the “telecommunications” and “broadcasting” 
paradigms. In addition, it ties the goal of the policy with the opportunity the new user-
experience offers. It requires ensuring that bridging the divide applies to all four 
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characteristics of the media, as it is their amalgamation that promises the potential of 
meaningful participation for all users.  
 
figure 1 
However, contemporary policy debates regarding digital exclusion do not take 
into account the development of new media technologies and their unique characteristics, 
and the impact these characteristics have on the information needs of the populace at 
large, and on the unique needs of distinct groups within it, in particular those weakened 
by social, cultural, political and economic marginalization. Srinuan and Bohlin’s (2010) 
comprehensive survey of literature on the digital divide identified three clusters of policy 
recommendations: leaving the divide to be remedied by market forces; calling for 
differentiated levels of government intervention; and addressing social, political and 
personal and 
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cultural aspects that are related to the divide. “Very few studies,” they conclude, 
“reported on how government intervention can encourage disadvantaged people to adopt 
more ICTs and their contents” (p. 19). We try to overcome this literature’s weaknesses by 
adopting van Dijk’s (2005) model as a tool for identifying the causes for the gap and the 
dynamics that maintain it, as well as principles of redistributive justice, to guide the 
policy that closes it. However, we first need to distinguish between the justifications for 
contemporary policy and the principles we suggest.   
Utilitarian and redistributional principles for reducing digital exclusion 
Utilitarianism is the most prominent philosophy guiding Western public policy since its 
emergence as a planned tool that serves to achieve social goals. Utilitarian policies 
conform to the principles of utility developed by the eighteenth century philosopher 
Jeremy Bentham and later explicated by his follower John Stuart Mill and others. 
 Utilitarian solutions are solutions that are to “augment the happiness of the 
community” in a way that is “greater than any which it has to diminish it” (Bentham, 
1789/1995, p. 13) and the “utilitarian standard” is formed by happiness that “is not the 
agent’s own happiness, but that of all concerned.” (Mill, 1863, p. 15) Utilitarian solutions 
conform to three main principles: First, they are goal-oriented rather than rights-based. 
Second, they are focused on maximizing the size of the economic cake rather than on the 
way the cake is distributed. Third, they may justify, perhaps even require, favoring the 
few at the expense of the many in the name of the “common good” (Schejter & Yemini, 
2007). 
 The focus on the well being of the aggregate rather than on that of the individual 
has had a profound effect on the way social policies were designed in order to reflect 
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justice. The wealth of nations, for example, has been determined by measures such as 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), whose growth is seen as the goal of policy. Indeed, 
evidence is provided that when average incomes of society rise, the average income of 
the poorest fifth rises proportionately (Dollar and Kraay, 2000) – a policy outcome 
commonly known as “trickle down economics” (Hopwood, Mellor & O’Brien, 2005). 
However, GDP, while reflecting growth in the total wealth (and therefore the rise in the 
cumulative happiness), is oblivious to the concerns raised by unfair distribution of the 
growing wealth (Sunstein, 1997), and the mere fact that the bottom fifth’s income has 
gone up still doesn’t mean it provides them with all (or any) of their basic needs. 
The distributional concerns are at the core of the challenge to the utilitarian 
understanding of justice, that has been brought up in the latter part of the twentieth 
century by the complementary theories of justice developed by John Rawls and Amartya 
Sen. Rawls asserts that social institutions need to be arranged in a “scheme of 
cooperation” (Rawls, 1971, p. 54-55) in which there are two principles: (1) that the basic 
liberties of each person, including freedom of speech, which falls under the basic liberty 
of freedom, should be guaranteed (Ibid, p. 60); and (2) that existing social and economic 
inequalities should be arranged so that they benefit all, particularly providing the greatest 
advantage to the least advantaged members of society (Rawls, 1999, p. 392).  
The idea is that the fortunes of the better off should not be established and secured 
unless it also advantages the least fortunate (Schejter & Yemini, 2007). The least 
fortunate are defined through the identification of the things that free and equal citizens 
need in order to cooperate fully as members of society, which Rawls coins “primary 
goods” (Rawls, 2001). First on this list are the basic rights and liberties, which are those 
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rights that allow citizens to make use of their basic moral powers, primarily the capacity 
for a sense of justice.  
Sen (1989/2003), while describing Rawls’s work as “the most important 
contribution to moral philosophy in recent decades” (p. 7), critiques its focus on the 
“primary goods” as the goal for equal distribution in a just society. His “capability 
approach” to justice describes a system that is at odds with the goals of both utilitarianist 
and Rawlsian justice. The goal of “happiness” at the root of utilitarianism is a very 
minimalistic goal in Sen’s eyes. It can be achieved by a very small incremental 
betterment of an individual’s position, one that may still leave him at a disadvantaged 
position and may not even provide him with his basic needs.  
At the same time Rawls’s concentration on the “primary goods” is also concerned 
with the means to achieving the individual’s goals and not with the way they are used or 
in the actual capability to realize the end result. “The problem with the Rawlsian 
accounting,” states Sen, “lies in the fact that, even for the same ends, people’s ability to 
convert primary goods into achievements differs, so that an interpersonal comparison 
based on the holdings of primary goods cannot, in general, also reflect the ranking of 
their respective real freedoms to pursue any given–or variable–ends.” (Ibid) Sen’s 
“capability approach” focuses therefore on the ends, not on the means; on the freedoms, 
and not on the ability to gain them; on a person’s actual capability to make use of the 
goods, services and opportunities available to them, rather than on the mere access to or 
ownership of those goods (Sen, 1980).  
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Applying distributional justice principles to digital exclusion policies 
In order to make Van Dijk’s (2005) model useful for policy development purposes we 
propose “beefing up” its components. Indeed, as seen in van Dijk’s model, digital 
exclusion is a reflection of other social differences and an ongoing process fed by those 
differences. It is most common to agree that socio-economic differences drive the digital 
divide and the technological exclusion it creates (i.e. Jansen, 2010; Talukdar & Gauri, 
2011; Cruz-Jesus, Oliveira & Bacao, 2012). However, socio-economic differences in 
themselves do not emerge out of thin air, but rather they are the consequence of deep-
rooted patterns of marginalization based on social exclusion. This leads to economic 
inequality and maintains it. To understand digital inclusion and its origins, we need to 
identify the social circumstances leading to it, the pattern of inequality that emerges from 
those circumstances, the elements of ICTs that those excluded are excluded from and the 
arena of participation they are excluded from. 
The digital exclusion model we propose, therefore (figure 2), breaks down van-
Dijk’s (2005) model to its building blocks in each element of the process. First, in 
identifying the “personal and positional categorical inequalities,” which are relational and 
drive differences in resources. Then we suggest to use Selwyn’s (2004) theoretical 
examination of digital exclusion and identification of the different types of capital that 
are distributed unevenly and the types of access they affect in order to pinpoint the 
different types of resources of which there is unequal distribution and the types of access 
to ICT’s that are affected by them. The specific characteristics of contemporary media we 
have identified in previous publications – abundance, mobility, interactivity and multi 
mediality (Schejter & Tiroh, 2014; 2015) – will serve to assess the quality of ICT usage 
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provided to individuals, and to help understand the contribution of imbalanced access to 
each of these charactersitics (which could be expressed in either lack of, or over-
dependence on one or more characteristic), to participation levels in society, and to the 
maintenance of socio-economic inequality and technological exclusion.  
The environments that drive socio-demographic differences to affect socio-
economic disparities are circumstance-specific to economic and social units with distinct 
historical backgrounds and other geo-political peculiarities. However, whatever the social 
distinctions are, they lead to socio-economic inequality. This commonality allows 
observations of technological exclusion to be conceptualized to a level of theorizing. 
Socio-economic inequality affects patterns of ownership of media technology and the 
ability to connect it to the Internet; creates differences in the capabilities to utilize these 
technologies, even when they are available; and highlights dissimilarities in the capacity 
to apply the fruits of such utilization to social and economic mobility.  
We propose as far as positional inequalities go, to search for gender, ethnicity, 
and social status inequalities. We want to add that some excluded groups reach that 
position voluntarily (for example for religious reasons), however we must include them 
in the model as they are digitally excluded and even if they prefer not to be included, 
their exclusion needs to be accounted for. This group is associated with gaps in access to 
ICTs in figure 2 with a dotted line. We then want to determine what kind of capital is 
being distributed unfairly and which characteristics of new media are allocated unevenly. 
In the last stage of providing empirical content to the model, we suggest identifying what 
participation exclusion is the result of these differences, and what type of capital 
difference does it feed back into.  
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Our refined model proposal (as presented in figure 2), also limits the circular 
motion to movement between the reduced level of participation and the socio-economic 
status, since the categorical inequalities that feed it, while constructed, are deeply rooted, 
and remedying them needs to start with the betterment of socio-economic stratification 
first, a goal that is achievable through separate public policies that are not necessarily 
connected to media or ICTs.  
 
figure 2 
The policy scheme arising from the empirical analysis we propose to conduct will 
identify, we believe, those most disadvantaged. Applying a Rawlsian philosophy to 
replace the current utilitarian framework, we suggest to focus remedial policies on the 
least advantaged members of society, those whose positional categorization led to the 
lowest level of digital participation. Most digital divide studies focus on the gap as it is 
demonstrated at a given point in time, however, “to make statements and to test 
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hypotheses about trends in computer or Internet penetration, it is necessary to have 
longitudinal or time-series data” (van Dijk & Hacker, 2003). In a recent effort to use the 
model in the Israeli case we found out that those at the bottom of digital capital, stay at 
the bottom and do not close the gap (Schejter, Ben-Harush & Tirosh, 2015).  
However, policy cannot stop at providing physical access alone, access needs to 
be effective as well. Effectiveness should not be driven by the needs of the market or of 
the information industries, but rather by the needs of the excluded users themselves as 
they define them; by the ability to fully utilize media’s qualities and be able to participate 
in society in rich and present ways. That is where the Senian approach steps in, 
identifying the needs of the disadvantaged and remedying them. The introduction of 
Senian inspired policies will add a new dimension to the communication policy 
conversation, a dimension befitting the personalized age of contemporary media and 
contemporary understandings of the justice considerations that should drive policy.  
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